Abstract:
Parliaments are an integral part of democracy, enhancing the quality of governance
through the various functions bestowed upon them such as legislation, oversight,
representation, and constituency service. Parliaments make use of committees to deliver
on some of these functions. The parliament of Botswana, as other parliaments elsewhere,
has at its disposal committees that help it to effectively perform its budgetary oversight
functions. While this paper acknowledges the various functions of parliament, it, however,
limits itself to parliament’s oversight function, especially, as it pertains to the budget. The
Parliament of Botswana is empowered to undertake approval and audit functions in the
budget cycle. Parliament performs these functions through two committees; namely: 1,
the Finance and Estimates Committee (FEC); and 2, the Public Accounts Committee
(PAC). Parliament is, however, often criticised for unsatisfactory performance of its
budgetary oversight function. While various explanations have been advanced for the
perceived ineffective performance of Parliament, this paper posits that Parliament’s
perceived ineffective performance of budgetary oversight is inherent within some of the
provisions and powers given to the budgetary oversight committees. Using qualitative
data collected through key informant interviews and desk research, this paper highlights
some of the inherent challenges and limitations leading to unsatisfactory performance.
The paper further presents some recommendations for averting the identified limitations
and challenges to enable parliamentary committees to ably execute their roles and
responsibilities to eventuate better and improved budgetary oversight.
Description:
The series comprises of papers which reflect work in progress or limited research efforts,
which may be of interest to researchers and policy makers, or of a public education
character. Working papers may already have been published elsewhere or may appear in
other publications.
