Mitigating Performance Limitations Faced by Parliament's Budgetary Oversight Committees in Botswana

Abstract

Parliaments are an integral part of democracy, enhancing the quality of governance through the various functions bestowed upon them such as legislation, oversight, representation, and constituency service. Parliaments make use of committees to deliver on some of these functions. The parliament of Botswana, as other parliaments elsewhere, has at its disposal committees that help it to effectively perform its budgetary oversight functions. While this paper acknowledges the various functions of parliament, it, however, limits itself to parliament’s oversight function, especially, as it pertains to the budget. The Parliament of Botswana is empowered to undertake approval and audit functions in the budget cycle. Parliament performs these functions through two committees; namely: 1, the Finance and Estimates Committee (FEC); and 2, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). Parliament is, however, often criticised for unsatisfactory performance of its budgetary oversight function. While various explanations have been advanced for the perceived ineffective performance of Parliament, this paper posits that Parliament’s perceived ineffective performance of budgetary oversight is inherent within some of the provisions and powers given to the budgetary oversight committees. Using qualitative data collected through key informant interviews and desk research, this paper highlights some of the inherent challenges and limitations leading to unsatisfactory performance. The paper further presents some recommendations for averting the identified limitations and challenges to enable parliamentary committees to ably execute their roles and responsibilities to eventuate better and improved budgetary oversight.